ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT) forms a foundation for cyber-physical systems. We propose an efficient and secure authentication scheme for machine-to-machine (M2M) networks in IoT enabled cyber-physical systems. Smart objects and smart devices over CPS are capable of capturing a variety of multimedia contents; interact with each other and also with the physical world in a fully automatic manner without human interference. The proposed scheme allows any pair of entities in an M2M network to mutually authenticate each other and agree on a session key for communicating data in a secure and efficient way. The authentication process does not incorporate the M2M service provider, and hence eliminates the burden of managing the authentication of massive scale devices at the edge of the network. The burden of the authentication process is offloaded and distributed on the gateways under the authority of this M2M service provider. The proposed scheme requires the mobile user to hold only one secret key provided by the M2M service provider, by which, he can roam randomly in the M2M network and authenticate to any of the gateways in the domain. Then, this authenticated gateway allows the mobile user to authenticate with any sensor node in the domain. In the proposed scheme, the authentication process does not rely on any public key cryptographic operations. Authentication is achieved using very few hash invocations and symmetric key encryptions. Therefore, the scheme is suitable for environmental sensors which are limited in resources (computation, storage, and energy). We analyze the security of the proposed scheme using BAN logic, which is widely accepted as a framework for the assessment of authentication protocols and also using ProVerif. We assess the efficiency of the proposed scheme and compare with some recently proposed schemes.
synchronized between physical locations and computational spaces. The Internet of Things (IoT) forms a foundation for cyber-physical systems.
For long distance remote devices (e.g. mobile and sensors), M2M is considered a promising accessing approach for IoT. The world has been made smaller by IoT, however, a gap still exists between our physical world and the cyber world. In the near future, this gap will vanish and all objects in the physical world will be connected to the cyber world by the Cyber-Physical System (CPS). Hence, there will be no longer a distinction between the cyber world and the physical world [1] , [2] . Objects and devices over CPS are capable of capturing a variety of multimedia contents, are able to exchange information (e.g. locations, states, telemetries, commands, etc.) among each other and also with the physical world in a fully automatic manner without human interference. According to [3] , a three-tier CPS consists of three main components. (i) In an environmental tier, there is a group of sensors. (ii) The service tier is formed by a set of actuators. (iii) The controllers forming the control tier. Information is collected by sensors from the physical system. This information is sent to the distributed controllers in the cyber system for processing. Once information is processed, the controllers conduct the actuators to issue the operations commands. Related operations and feedback generation are activated by the actuators to impose on the physical system. Through these operations, CPS is able to accomplish selfawareness, self-adjustments and judgments [4] .
M2M communication is the way to implement the function of the environmental tier in CPS. In M2M, sensors and smart/mobile devices communicate with each other utilizing both wired and wireless links. The communication system of an M2M consists of three domains that are interlinked together [5] , [1] . As shown in Figure 1 As remote devices/sensors -also called ''environmental devices'' (Env. devices) -are usually found faraway in unattended or forbidden areas, it is likely that the sensors might be hacked by assailants and pirated. For instance, the software might be infused or tainted by specific pernicious codes, which might change or manufacture approaching active information. Also, the sensors might perform self-assertive (Byzantine) rowdiness subsequent to being compromised. Thus, the information sent by remote detecting sensors must be verified. Otherwise, remote beneficiaries on the other side would receive manipulated information and thus react erroneously. The M2M remote/environmental sensors are managed and controlled by an entity called, M2M Service Provider (MSP). This entity also conducts registration of the other entities and executes initialization/setup of the system parameters.
In M2M, as the system mainly deals with machines, the authentication strategies are indeed different from conventional authentication. Many existing authentication techniques assume that the entities to be authenticated are humans. Therefore, password (memorable patterns) based authentication and biometric (e.g. fingerprint, voice patterns, etc.) based authentication strategies are not applicable or at least inefficient in the context of M2M authentication.
Our Contribution: This paper contributes to propose an authentication scheme for M2M networks in the CPS system. The scheme is computationally efficient in the sense that, it requires the mobile device and the sensors to perform only very few symmetric encryption/decryption operations and very few hash invocations. And for this reason, the proposed scheme is more suitable for the resource-constrained environment as compared to schemes already presented in the literature as will be depicted during efficiency evaluation. The mobile sensor nodes are not required to perform any public key cryptographic operations. We prove the security of the proposed scheme using the BAN logic framework [6] , [7] that is widely accepted for the assessment of authentication protocols. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of the scheme and compare its performance with related schemes.
Paper Organization: The related work is given in section 2. Section 3 describes the network model, assumptions and threat model. Section 4 is about the description of the proposed scheme. The security of the scheme is analyzed and proved in section 5. The efficiency of our scheme is evaluated in section 6. Comparisons with previous proposals are given in section 7. Finally, the conclusion is in section 8.
II. RELATED WORK
Many authentication schemes such as [8] [9] [10] have been proposed for different applications. The work in [11] proposed a scheme to filter out bad reports in the M2M system. The scheme is a cooperative authentication scheme which is bandwidth efficient. Although, it well protects against compromising attacks that is undetectable due to the fact that, the compromise occurs when the nodes acquire sleep mode, the scheme does not addresses the protection of the system attacks like impersonation attacks, replay attacks, etc.
In [12] , using existing authentication schemes in mobile telecommunication operators, a novel approach has been proposed for automated over-the-air authentication for M2M networks. The implementation of the scheme actually extends the existing standard architecture of generic bootstrapping (GBA), which already exists in the 3G project specifications. The coordinator node derives the required shared keys by authenticating itself to the mobile operator. The subsequent communication between the M2M server and the coordinating node is performed using the shared keys. However, feasibility of the GBA extension is questionable. The work VOLUME 7, 2019 also did not analyze the vulnerability to different attacks in the M2M system.
A healthcare dedicated M2M architecture has been proposed in [13] . The scheme supports hospital applications with the mobility of patients and doctors. They employed ID-based authentication strategies for M2M system. The scheme uses pair wise key pre-distribution for the establishment of a shared key between the sensor node and the mobile sink. It seems that the proposed scheme is able to stand against impersonation attacks due to the employment of dynamic ID's. However, inspections show that the scheme is not able to withstand DoS and replay attacks. Another shortcoming is the easy disclosure of the identities of the mobile and sensor devices. The work in [2] did not aim at devising a particular scheme. They adopted a rigor and formal model in the theory of cryptography in an attempt to construct a generic framework for the analysis of the security and functionality of M2M authentication schemes. Four adversarial models were proposed to tackle different attacks. However, the framework lacks the details of any specific authentication scheme, any specific application and the corresponding attacks. The contribution of [14] focuses mostly on withstanding man-in-themiddle attack. The protocol protects the information privacy of other machines and users that are not the subjects of the communication.
Recently, in [1] , ID-based cryptosystems were employed, combined with key exchange strategies, in particular, the Authenticated Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) without Key-Escrow (AIBCwKE) mechanism. The scheme seems to withstand most of the known attacks; however, the scheme requires the target sensors and mobile devices to perform computationally expensive cryptographic operations. It requires a sensor to perform several bilinear pairing operations on elliptic curves in addition to several point multiplications and exponentiations. These computation requirements are not adequate for devices with very limited resources. The proposed scheme does not rely on any PKI. The proposed scheme can authenticate any pair of devices in an M2M site using only few symmetric encryptions/decryptions and few invocations of a hash function. These computations are extremely lightweight compared to other ID-based cryptosystems which require computationally expensive cryptographic operations on elliptic curves.
III. ASSUMPTIONS, DESCRIPTION AND MODEL
As depicted in Figure 2 , the four main entities of the proposed scheme are as follows: (i) M2M service provider (MSP), it conducts registration of the other entities and executes initialization/setup of the system parameters. (ii) Environmental devices or sensors, which are very limited in resources (computation, storage and energy). (iii) Mobile devices which have limited energy resources although are richer at resources as compared to environmental sensors. (iv) Gateways, which are the pivot of all the authentication protocols between any pair of devices. There is at least one gateway in every M2M site. Some of the sensors are directly connected to the gateway while others may connect indirectly through another connected sensor or a mobile device after authenticating with the gateway. The MSP is considered to be trustworthy for obvious reasons as it is authorized for generating all the secret parameters required by the system. All other entities may behave maliciously.
The proposed scheme requires a mobile user to contact the MSP only once to register his identity and obtain a long-term master secret key of sufficiently long bit-length. Later, without the incorporation of the MSP, the mobile user, roaming randomly in the M2M network (using this master secret key) is able to mutually authenticate with any of the gateways under the authority of the MSP. Once a user authenticates with any of the gateways, he is able to mutually authenticate with any of the sensors registered on this gateway. Moreover, the sensors are not necessarily required to be connected to the gateway at the time of authentication. Also, the scheme allows any two sensors in the M2M network to mutually authenticate and exchange data. After system initialization and registration of all entities, the authentication phase of the scheme between any two sensors/devices does not incorporate the MSP and consists mainly of four protocols:
• Protocol I: Allows the mobile device (using its master secret key) to mutually authenticate with any gateway.
• Protocol II: Given that protocol I was executed successfully between a mobile user and the gateway. The mobile user, with the help of the gateway, is able to mutually authenticate with any of the sensors within the domain of this gateway.
• Protocol III: Allows any two sensors, where at least one of them is connected to a gateway, to establish an authenticated channel between each other.
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• Protocol IV: Allows any two sensors disconnected from the gateway to establish an authenticated channel. This is accomplished with the help of another sensor that is connected to the gateway. Threat model: Following three varieties of adversaries are considered for the proposed scheme:
(i)Outsider adversary: This adversary is capable to eavesdrop on all possible communication links in the system. It can record as well as replay messages to any party involved in the communication. It can decompose as well as reassemble an eavesdropped message (plaintext/cipher text) into a new message to resend it to any of the legal participating entity. It can use the compromised secret keys for decryption and interpretation of the encrypted messages.
1. Device corruption adversary: It has all capabilities that an outsider adversary possesses. Further, it can utilize the secret key shared on the device for decrypting/forging the eavesdropped messages. Thus, it fully controls the captured device. 2. MSP corruption adversary: Along with the capabilities that an outsider adversary possesses, it can also steal/manipulate MSP database system.
IV. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The scheme follows the M2M architecture given in Figure 2 .
There is an M2M service provider (MSP) and a set of gateways under the authority of this MSP. Each gateway is connected to a set of sensors. There is also a set of mobile users. At any time, a user may want to authenticate with any of the gateways he/she authorized for (by the MSP). Also, the user may want to authenticate with any of the sensors to monitor/collect information. Finally, we assume that any two sensors may want to authenticate each other for the purpose of communicating data. The important notations used in the scheme are shown in Table 1 .
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
• The MSP has its own public/private key pair (pk MSP , sk MSP ) of a digital signature algorithm for authentication purposes with her gateways (GW). The public key pk MSP is stored on each GW under the authority of MSP.
• The MSP generates a public/private key pair (pk GW , sk GW ) for each GW. The MSP stores pk GW for each GW, while sk GW is stored on the corresponding GW. We emphasize that these public keys are used only in the registration process between the MSP and her gateways. The authentication phase is irrelevant to these public keys.
• The MSP assigns a unique identity ID GW for each GW.
• The M2M network administrator installs a shared master secret key on the GW and each of the sensors (S) in the domain. Thus, each sensor S shares a random unique master secret key k
GW with the GW. Also, each sensor S knows the identity ID GW while the GW knows the identities ID S of the sensors in the domain. 
B. MOBILE USER REGISTRATION OVER A SECURE CHANNEL
The registration phase is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Over a secure channel, a mobile user M approaches the MSP with his chosen identity ID M and password PW M . MSP determines the identities, ID GW of the gateways that this user VOLUME 7, 2019 is authorized for and wants to communicate with. The user registers as follows: 
M inserts the smartcard into the card reader and
GW > This finalizes the registration phase. The MSP stores the identities of all the mobile users and gateways and the users k M in a secure database. The user M stores the tuple
C. PROTOCOL I: MOBILE-GATEWAY AUTHENTICATION
The mobile user M must first authenticate itself to the gateway GWand establishes a session key for data transfer. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 4 and operates as follows:
1. M → GW:
• Picks a random nonce r M .
• Sends (broadcasts) the tuple, ( Hello GW, ID M , r M ).
GW → M :
• Checks that ID M exists and fetches the corresponding k
• Retrieves his master key k M = L ⊕ H (PW M ) and using k M and the received ID GW , locally computes k
GW , decrypts for r M and r GW • Checks r M with the received value. Aborts if r M is not valid, else,
• Picks k s as a session key.
• Computes the symmetric encryption E k
GW:
• Using k
GW , decrypts for r GW and k s . Checks r GW . Aborts if r GW is not valid, else, accept k s as a session key. 
D. PROTOCOLII: MOBILE-SENSOR AUTHENTICATION
Recall that, GW shares a master secret key k
GW with each sensor node in the domain. Also, recall that the user M shares a secret key k
GW with the GW he already authenticated in Protocol I. Notice that M shares nothing with any of the sensors. We assume that M knows the identity of each sensor, IDswe assume that, GWis always reachable by M, while the sensor may not be able to reach GW. This situation is common, for example, if the sensor is a moving sensor that may reach a distance out-ranging the gateway.
In the following we give the description of the authentication protocol to allow different M2M sensors which may or may not be connected to the gateway at the time of authentication, to authenticate with a user M with the help of the gateway GW. The user M s device is the device guaranteed to be connected to the gateway (e.g. via WiFi, Zigbee, over a GPRS, GSM, etc.). Protocol II sequence diagram is shown in Figure 5 and described next.
M, sends a tuple including its identity ID M ,the identity of the target sensor, ID S . Once the message in step one reaches S, S replies with a message encrypted with the pre-shared key k (S) GW to M , which contains the identity of M , ID M identity of S, IDs and S s random nonce r S generated by sensor S 3. M → GW:
IDs,r s ) > M forwards the encryption it received from S to the GW, side by side with a random nonce r M generated by him. Notice that ID S must be sent in the clear to tell GW which secret key k
M , ID M , r s ) > The GW prepares an encapsulated encryption. The outer encryption is dedicated for M including the nonce r M for authenticating the GW to M and the new session key k
(S)
M between M and S,picked by GW. The inner encryption is dedicated for S including the nonce r S for authenticating GW to S and the same session key between M and S. 
GW and k
GW respectively with GW, want to communicate with each other or with the gateway GW. We assume the general case, that only one sensor is reachable by the GW. Here, we have two different scenarios, each require a different protocol:
•Protocol III. One sensor node, say S d , wants to communicate with the GW, however, S d is out-ranging GW and the only way to establish a connection is through S c which is connected to the GW.
•Protocol IV. S d1 and S d2 are both out-ranging the GW. However, one of them is connected to S c ,which is connected to the GW. S d1 and S d2 want to mutually authenticate with each other to exchange data. The connected node S c will help them to establish a session key, k 
1) PROTOCOL III
We assume S d is out-ranging GW, while S c is connected to both S d and GW. In this case, the protocol allows the establishment of a session key, k
between S c and S d and also a session key K between GWand S c so that, the link '' S d -S c -GW'' becomes fully authenticated and private. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 6 and is as follows:
1. GW to GW, which contains identity IDs d, and random nonce r S d identity ID S c and random nonce r S c generated by node S c . GW decrypts the messages using the preshared key. GW recognizes that sensor node S d is the node that want to authenticate with GW. GW then determines the most suitable sensor node to be connected with S d and sends the tuple in step (3) to the right node (assumed S c ) as a reply, meanwhile GW sends a termination message to other nodes to inform them that their cooperation is no longer needed.
GW → S c :
< ID GW , ID S c E k
encrypted with with k
GW .Included in these encryptions, the session key with k
Picked by GW for S c and S d and K as the session key between S c and GW picked by GW for this session. Now S c decrypts the message with with k (S c ) GW and gets the session key K and with k
, and forwards them to S d together with the other encryption (dedicated to S d , from GW) as shown in step (4)).
On the reception, S d decrypts the first encryption to obtain k
, by which, S d decrypts the second encryption the to obtain both nonces. S d verifies the correctness of the nonce r S d and uses, r S c to confirm to S c in the next final step.
2) PROTOCOL IV
In this protocol, the two sensor nodes S d1 and S d2 do not share any keys with each other, and are disconnected form GW, yet, each node share a master key k
GW . with GW. The protocol allows both nodes to authenticate and establish a session key with each other. At least one node (S d1 is connected to a third node S c . This S c is connected to GW and shares a master key k
GW with GW. The protocol is as follows: .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we assess the security of the proposed scheme. The assessment is based on the basic security requirements, informal discussion on resistance to general attacks, formal security proof using the well-known BAN logic framework.
A. BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In the following, we show that the proposed scheme realizes the basic security requirements.
1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
Mutual Authentication in Protocol I, between M and GW is attained as both can deduce M -GW secret key k
which is used to encrypt/decrypt for the session key k s . The session key k s cannot coincide at M and GW so far the encryption and decryption are executed with the same secret key k
GW at its end with its master secret key k M and identity ID GW of the gateway. Similarly, MSP has generated k (M ) GW and provided it securely to the GW. Thus, if a GW identity ID GW is claimed without knowing k
GW , this GW cannot be authenticated by a valid user. Further, a mobile user without possessing correct K M matching with ID M stored in the database of GW, will not be validated by the GW.
In protocol II, both M and GW have already authenticated each other agreed on the shared secret key k
GW . Also the sensor node S already shares a secret key k
GW .GW is the pivot entity to allow both M and S to share a session key k
GW . Once M requests a connection with S, S replies with the encryption E k (S) GW
(ID M , ID S , r S ) dedicated to GW, so M forwards the encryption to GW with his random nonce r M . This encryption contthe random nonce r s that can be seen only by GW and which will be verified later by S. GW replies with the encapsulated encryption encryption E k
GW to both M and S and also the random nonces for verification.
Protocol III is a modification of protocol II, in the sense that, the sensor disconnected from GW in the entity that requests the connection with the sensor connected to GW. Each sensor shares a secret key with GW. The mutual authentication follows from protocol II. The mutual authentication follows for protocol IV as well.
2) CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION SESSION
In each of the proposed protocols, the shared session key is confirmed by both the participants prior to indulge in any subsequent communication. Only the legitimate participants and GW have knowledge of the master secret keys required for encryption/decryption of the session key. Hence, the scheme maintains the confidentiality of communication.
3) LOW COMPUTATION AND STORAGE COST
The proposed scheme does not involve any public key computations by any entity during the authentication protocols. Only few symmetric encryptions/decryptions and hash invocations are required. Further, the scheme necessitates the mobile user as well as the sensor nodes to store few short identities and one master secret key. Therefore, the proposed scheme is efficiently and easily implementable on smartcards and sensors with very limited resources. Therefore, the proposed scheme exhibits quite low computation and storage costs.
4) PROTECTION OF GW-M AND GW-S KEY
The authentication protocol I treats k
GW as a master key in the sense that, this key is never used to encrypt plaintexts that are not random. Notice that, the plaintext encrypted by k (M ) GW always contains r GW as a random nonce that is never sent over the public channel and is totally unknown to an eavesdropper. This protects k
GW from known plaintext attacks. An inspection of protocols II, III and IV shows that the same protection is attained for the master keys k
GW shared between the GW and any sensor S.
5) SESSION INDEPENDENCE
In the proposed scheme, the previous session keys do not contribute to the deduction of fresh session keys, meaning thereby, no relationship among the previous and fresh session keys. Every time, a fresh random string is to serve as a session key. For this reason, leakage of one session key has no affect on other past/future sessions for any pair of entities.
B. PROTECTION OF MOBILE USER'S MASTER KEY K M
The master key k M of M is protected with M 's password inside the smartcard/mobile device as it is stored as
Further, the master key k M is used only to generate the keys k
GW allows the attacker to perform brute force attack as an attempt to reach k M , Since k M is used only as an input to a hash function, its bit-length is not constrained (e.g. is not limited to the required length of a block cipher key.). Therefore, the MSP freely set this master key sufficiently long to withstand brute force in case any GW is compromised.
C. ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
We informally discuss how the proposed scheme withstands different types of adversarial attacks described in the threat model. VOLUME 7, 2019
1) ROGUE GATEWAY
When an adversary corrupts/compromises a gateway GW, then it knows all the secret parameters stored on this GW: k
GW and sk GW . We give emphasis to the following.
• This compromise does not leads to security-breach of k M , the master secret key of any mobile user M, provided the hash function used possesses strong one-way property and that k M is with long enough bit-length.
• Compromising the gateway GW does not allow the adversary to deduce any other M-GW secret keys on any other gateway. This follows from the fact that, the M -GW keys are produced independently by applying a one -way hash function on k M and ID GW , since k M is unknown to the adversary. The countermeasure for a GW compromise is as follows: Firstly, the corrupted GW is cleaned (scanned, rebooted, etc.) with a new public/private key pair pk GW , sk GW , then the MSP selects a new identity, say ID' GW , specifically for this gateway and re-generates new set of M -GW secret keys,
. Afterwards, the MSP securely provides these secret keys to GW as discussed during the registration phase. Mobile users are informed publically about the rogue identity ID GW . Finally, the system administrator reinstalls new fresh master secret keys k
GW . for each sensors S in the domain of this GW.
2) ROGUE SENSOR NODE
The only secret stored at the sensor node S is its master secret key which is shared with the GW. This key was chosen at random and installed by the system administrator independently. So, the countermeasure against adversarial knowledge of this key is as easy as installing a new shared key k (S) GW on this sensor and on the gateway. If a sensor node becomes completely rogue and physically captured by the adversary, then the system administrator simply deletes the shared key k
GW from the gateway.
3) COMPROMISED MOBILE DEVICE
To reduce the risk of such an attack, the master secret key k M of a mobile user is required to be stored on a secure tamper proof device. However, still there is a chance for the adversary to compromise this key. Compromise of the master secret key k M of a mobile user M , does not affect other mobile users. Nevertheless, M must report to the MSP of its compromised master secret key k M and must ask for revocation of k M and registration of a new one. In this case, the MSP picks a new master key for M and then generates a new set of GW-M keys, k
and sends them to the gateways.
4) STOLEN MOBILE DEVICE/SMARTCARD
If the user's device is stolen by an attacker, he/she will not be able to procure the master secret key k M . of M . The master key k M of M is protected with M 's password inside the smartcard/mobile device as it is stored as L = H (PW M ) ⊕ k M . Thus, even if an attacker happens to extract L stored inside the smartcard/mobile device of M , he/she cannot retrieve k M as the attacker does not know the password of M .
5) MSP DATABASE COMPROMISE
An attacker may find his way to the MSP database servers to disclose the user's master keys. A counter measure against such attack is that, the MSP stores all users' master encrypted under the MSP master key. The MSP master key is then stored on a tamperproof device away from form the database. In this case, stealing the MSP database becomes user less.
6) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Suppose an adversary puts itself as an intermediate node between any two communicating entities. This adversary does not know the master secret keys of this pair of entities. Certainly, the adversary would try to impersonate each entity to the other entity. But, as the adversary is unknown of any of the master secret keys, she is unable to convince any of the entities that she is the other entity. She is unable to generate any correct hashes or encryptions. So, this attack fails.
D. FORMAL SECURITY PROOFS
Now follows, the security of the proposed protocols using the BAN logic.
Lemma 1: Assuming E and H used in protocol I are secure pseudo-random function families, then protocol I utilizing E and H is a secure mutual entity authentication and key exchange protocol.
Proof: Given that H is a strong hash function and that k M is sufficiently long master secret key for M . A compromise of any k (M ) GW = H (ID GW , k M ) does not allow a computationally bounded adversary to reach k M . Now given that both GW and M believe in k
GW , we continue the proof of this Lemma using BAN logic as follows:
Idealization. The idealized messages between M and GW in protocol I are as follows:
Assumptions.
•
Analysis.
• From A1, A3 and M2, we have,
(Belief rule) Thus, goal G4 is satisfied.
• From A2, A4 and M3, we have,
Thus, goal G2 is reached.
Thus, goal G3 is satisfied.
• From assumption A5 and A6 we have,
Thus, goal G1 is reached. Lemma 2: Assuming E used in protocol II is a secure pseudo-random function family, then protocol II utilizing E is a secure mutual entity authentication and key exchange protocol.
Proof: Idealization:
• From message M4 and the assumptions
),
This satisfies goal G2. The second encryption of M4 and encryption in message M5 satisfy the secondary goals:
The proof for protocol IV follows in a similar way to the proof of protocol II and III and hence, omitted. We now state the following theorem:
Theorem 1: The M2M authentication scheme presented in this paper is a secure M2M mutual authentication and key exchange scheme assuming H and E are secure pseudo-random functions.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemma1, Lemma2 and Lemma3.
VI. EFFICIENCY EVALUATION
This section is about the evaluation of the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
A. STORAGE REQUIREMENTS

M2M Service Provider (MSP):
The MSP is required to store her own master key k MSP , her signature key sk MSP and the public keys of all gateways under her authority. It is required to store the identity of each registered mobile device ID M as well as his secret key k M .
M2M Gateway (GW):
Each GW is required to store the signature verification key pk MSP of MSP, its own private key sk GW , the tuple (ID M ,k Sensor node S: Each sensor node is required to store its shared key k
GM with the GW.This is in addition to the identities of other sensors in its area.
B. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY
The computation cost is described next.
Mobile user M: In protocol I, M performs a hash invocation, a symmetric encryption and a symmetric decryption. In protocol II, M performs a symmetric encryption and a symmetric decryption using k
GM . Sensor node S: In protocol II, S performs one invocation of symmetric encryption and one invocation of symmetric decryption. In protocol III, S c performs two symmetric encryptions and one symmetric decryption. S d performs one symmetric decryption and one symmetric encryption. We take the larger cost as the sensor cost for this protocol. Protocol IV requires double the cost of protocol III.
Gateway GW: In protocol I, GW is required to perform a symmetric encryption and a symmetric decryption. In protocol II, GW performs a symmetric decryption and two symmetric encryptions. The cost in protocol III is one symmetric key decryption and two symmetric encryptions. Protocol IV is the same as protocol III.
C. COMPUTATION COST
Let c h be the computation time of one hash invocation. One symmetric encryption costs roughly the same as a one hash invocation. Based on this assumption, Table 2 shows the computation time of each entity in each protocol with c h as the time unit.
D. COMPUTATION TIME
Recalling the experimental results of [15] where the authors have implemented cryptographic primitives on different brands of smartcards and mobile phones manufacturers. An implementation of SHA-1 on Oberthur ID-one v7.0a smart card takes on the average of 50 ms, while it takes 0.02 ms on ASUS-TF300T tablet. Based on these results, the computation time of each protocol in the proposed scheme is given in Table 3 . 
VII. COMPARISONS
In this section, we compare the proposed scheme to other recently proposed schemes. However, other proposed schemes use different cryptographic operations. Therefore, we remind the experimental results attained in [16] , [17] , Table 4 displays the computation timings of various cryptographic operations mapped to the hash invocation time c h as the time unit. We believe that this mapping to a unified time unit makes the comparison clearer.
Based on the information given in Table 4 , we compare the computation cost of the proposed scheme with two recent schemes. We compare the proposed scheme with Chen et al. scheme [1] and Sun et al. scheme [18] . The comparison is given in Table 5 .
As illustrated in Table 5 , the proposed scheme proves extreme efficiency over the recent scheme of Chen et al. [1] .
Their protocol requires a mobile user to perform computations that cost 7690 c h while the sensor is required to perform a total of 5467.5 c h . The proposed protocol requires the mobile user to perform computations equivalent to 5 c h , while it requires 11 c h for the sensor nodes.
In Sun et al. scheme [18] , their protocol authenticates the mobile user to the MSP, but there is no consideration of authentication of the mobile user to the sensor nodes and how sensor nodes authenticate each other. In spite of these shortcomings, the efficiency of the proposed scheme is still closely comparable to their scheme. However, the proposed scheme provides a more complete service.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In the CPS, M2M is an emerging technology that promises to reduce the gap between the physical system and the cyber system. Authenticating machines in M2M networks is an important service that must exist to withstand different possible attacks against the M2M machines in M2M networks. We have proposed a scheme to realize this service. The proposed scheme allows any pair of entities in an M2M network to authenticate each other and establish a secure session key for exchanging private data. The proposed scheme eliminates the burden of the authentication process from the MSP and distributes this burden on the gateways under her authority. The mobile user, with only one master secret key provided by the MSP and roaming randomly in the M2M sites is able to authenticate with any of the gateways under the authority of this MSP. Using his master secret key, the mobile user is capable of authenticating any of the sensors in any M2M site. The proposed scheme allows any pair of sensors to authenticate each other with the help of this gateway. The authentication protocols in the proposed scheme do not rely on any public key cryptosystems.
The proposed scheme is quite low at computation and communication cost as it requires few invocations of hash functions and symmetric key encryptions/decryptions. As a result, the proposed scheme is lightweight and suitable for devices with very limited resources. We have proved the security of the proposed scheme using the BAN logic. We have showed the proposed scheme to withstand different potential adversarial attacks. We have evaluated the efficiency of the proposed scheme and compared it to recent protocols. From the entire study, we conclude that the proposed scheme is efficient and suitable for M2M networks with mobile users having low powered devices.
